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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS 
JOHN M. DONAHUE and MEREDITH B. McGUIRE 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Trinity University, San Antonio, TX 78212, U.S.A. 
Abstract-This article addresses the question: to what extent do health care strategies in a given political 
economy increase people's perceptions of responsibility to take charge of their health, but do not 
structurally empower them to satisfy their health needs. In shaping health care policies, societies typically 
adopt one of three broad strategies, linking their larger political economy and modes of exercising power: 
a marketplace strategy, a state-managerial strategy or a national participatory strategy. Because of their 
different arrangements of structural power, these strategies result in three very different approaches to 
responsibility for health and illness. Changes in the political economy of health in Nicaragua during the 
Somoza, Sandinista and Chamorro periods illustrate the changing fields of choice within which 
care-seekers must make their health care decisions. 
Key words-politics, health responsibility, Nicaragua 
The question of individual accountability in health 
and illness can be phrased in several ways. One might 
ask to what extent the burden of 'guilt' or 'blame' 
should be placed on the individual or on the social 
environment in which people find themselves? 
Medical sociologists and anthropologists typically 
approach this theme by analyzing health-seeking 
processes and the social etiology of disease. In order 
to address the policy implications of this theme, 
however, a political economy of health and illness 
provides a useful perspective for our discussion of 
accountability and responsibility. How might an 
analysis of power and its exercise within the arena 
of health and illness help us to understand, first, 
how responsibility is defined and exercised, and 
then how shame and guilt for illness are assigned? 
Specifically, we suggest that the political economy in 
which a health system operates strongly influences 
people's perceptions of responsibility for their health, 
but may not structurally empower them to satisfy 
their health needs. 
STRUCTURAL POWER AND THE EXERCISE 
OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In his Distinguished Lecture, Eric Wolf [I) 
describes four modes of the exercise of power, all 
of which, we argue, can be found within any political 
economy. The first three are the individual, the 
social and the tactical; they describe power as inter­
actional. Individual power refers to a person's ability 
or capacity to influence the play of power. Social or 
dyadic power is displayed in the attempts of one 
person to exert control over or influence another. 
Organizational or tactical power applies when an 
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actor in one field of activity is able to restrain the 
activity of an actor in another setting. 
The fourth mode of power, structural power, is 
less visible because it is not directly observed in the 
field of interpersonal relations. According to Wolf 
(1, p. 587), structural power is the ability to deploy 
and allocate labor in a social field in such a way 
as "to render some kinds of behavior possible, while 
making others less possible or impossible." Structural 
power varies according to political economy; the 
exercise of that structural power, in turn, affects the 
exercise of the three interactional modes of power. 
These differences in structural power profoundly 
influence each society's allocation of responsibility 
for health and illness. 
The exercise of structural power is often less overt 
and more difficult to discern (and, thus, to contest) 
than interpersonal power, because it is so subtly em­
bedded in a social structure. Social control exercised 
in the mode of social power, for example, might be 
observed in police crowd-control or corporate pro­
motions and firing-i.e. situations where the actions 
and opposing interests of actors are relatively identifi­
able. By contrast, structural power often manifests 
itself in getting actors to self-constrain and self-limit, 
for example by controlling the terms of discourse. 
Thus, in the case of health and health care, structural 
power may dictate: You must watch yourself to see 
that you control your body and emotions to conform 
to our norms; we will specify how you may conceptu­
alize health and health care in articulating your 
needs. 
Similarly, masked by seemingly neutral tech­
nologies, structural power can be more far-reaching 
than interpersonal tactical power. Implicit in each 
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technology are important political outcomes, such 
as whether it promotes centralization of decision­
making and control, inequality, hierarchy and domin­
ation, vast scale of organization, or sacrifice of civil 
liberties. Technologies include both organizational 
and mechanical arrangements. The decision to invest 
in high-tech mechanical technologies, thus, carries 
implicit political outcomes for their management. 
Similarly, certain organizational technologies (such 
as the medical referral system) will tend to reproduce 
a hierarchical structure, such as patron-clientism; by 
contrast, other organizational technologies (such as 
those involving primary health care and community 
health workers) tend to encourage local control over 
health care choices. The exercise of structural power 
is exemplified by the decision to implement technol­
ogies, whereby political implications are glossed over 
by the representation that the choice was made on 
purely technical-rational grounds [2). 
In shaping health care policies, societies typically 
adopt one of three broad strategies, linking their larger 
political economy and modes of exercising power. The 
marketplace strategy emphasizes individual behavior 
as consumers in a medical marketplace of goods 
and services. The role of the state is theoretically 
limited to keeping the marketplace open and active. 
Considerable professional and corporate marketplace 
control, however, greatly constrains the actual free­
dom for individual choice in the medical marketplace. 
The state-managerial strategy, by contrast, removes 
the health-related issues from the marketplace, but 
emphasizes professional and/or state-bureaucratic 
managerial control over most areas of health decision­
making and allocation of programmatic resources. 
A third approach, the national participatory strategy 
retains national level policy efforts and economic 
support for health programs, but emphasizes broad 
individual and community participation in both 
decision-making and health promoting actions. 
Because of their different arrangements of structural 
power, these strategies result in three very different 
approaches to individual responsibility for health and 
illness. 
THE FIELD OF HEAL TH CHOICES IN A 
HEALTH MARKETPLACE 
In the United States, for example, the structural 
power of corporate and medical professional interests 
results in individual responsibility for health being 
defined in terms of consumer and life-style behavior. 
The 'responsible' person, thus, is one who buys 
sufficient health insurance, consumes the right diet 
and avoids consuming the wrong products, purchases 
health professional care wisely, takes prescribed 
medications and complies with other 'doctors­
orders,' spends stress-reducing vacations, and invests 
in a good health spa. The commodification of health, 
fitness and beauty directly serves the interests of 
powerful actors in the capitalist marketplace. By 
shifting the major portion of responsibility for health 
to the individual and defining that responsibility in 
terms of consumer behavior, this system reduces its 
attention to corporate or state responsibilities for 
people's health or illness. 
The biomedical paradigm itself contributes to 
the emphasis on individualistic, rather than social 
or political, approaches to disease. The biomedical 
paradigm treats disease as a feature or property of 
the patient, as if disease were an objective 'thing' 
which the patient 'has' [3). For example, if work in a 
chemical factory creates health risks for workers, the 
location of disease as a property of individual bodies 
leads to an emphasis on finding which individuals 
are more likely to 'react' to workplace toxins. 
Accordingly, the corporate responsibility is reduced 
to counselling individuals 'at risk' to change positions, 
rather than to reducing the exposure of all workers or 
eliminating certain industrial processes that require 
use of toxic substances. The biomedical model trans­
forms occupational disease into a thing that befalls 
some individuals, rather than viewing it as the result 
of human decisions made by real people (even if in 
the guise of corporate actors) affecting their own or 
others' health. 
The emphasis upon disease as an object that 
occurs within an individual, produces the tendency 
to locate responsibility for illness in the individual, 
often resulting in blaming the victim. The sick person 
is assumed to be responsible for having taken health 
risks, such as accepting a hazardous job, failing to 
use seat-belts, or moving to an area with polluted 
water. The individual is held accountable for un­
healthy lifestyle choices, such as smoking, drinking, 
poor eating habits or lack of exercise, as well as for 
illness-producing emotional styles and characteristic 
responses to stress [4]. Such emphasis upon the 
individual's responsibility for illness often results in 
inattention to the sick person's whole situation. For 
example, one study of doctor-patient communication 
noted the extent to which the patient's larger social 
predicament (such as an extremely stressful workplace) 
was generally ignored or reduced to individualistic 
treatments, such as recommendation of tranquilizers 
or a vacation [5]. 
Similarly, health care workers often attach 
considerable blame to a patient's non-compliance 
with doctors' 'orders' (note the power differential 
implied in this concept). In many cases, assignment 
of responsibility to the patient does not take into 
account any of the situational factors that would 
make a real difference in whether the sick person is 
enabled to comply. For example, if the therapeutic 
regimen for an obese hypertensive woman, who is 
holding down two jobs to support her mother and 
three teenage children, fails to take into account the 
very real limitations of her daily life, it is merely shift­
ing responsibility-and blame for inevitable failure to 
comply-to her, on top of all her other burdens [6). 
Nevertheless, the U.S. policy strategy of focusing on 
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individual responsibility for health and illness meshes 
conveniently with other cultural ideals, especially the 
emphasis on individual control and self-discipline in 
lifestyle behaviors [7]. 
Instead of examining the conditions of work that 
create stress, the medical model radically changes the 
field of choices for reducing stress. Instead of looking 
at the marriage, family and work pressures of a 
compulsive overeater or smoker, emphasis is upon 
individual willpower to control personal behavior. 
A medical model which locates illness as a property 
of the sick individual contributes to the one-sided 
assignment of responsibility to that individual, without 
promoting any of the social or environmental changes 
which would empower the individual to prevent illness 
or get well. Because this individualistic definition of 
responsibility is embedded in the cultural package 
of Western medicine, it may also inadvertently inform 
state-managerial and participatory strategies. 
STRUCTURAL POWER IN THE 
STATE-MANAGERIAL APPROACH 
Historically in most capitalist and socialist 
countries, working class organizations have been able 
to successfully promote the establishment of a 
national health sy>tem [8). Thus, health ceases to 
be a privilege of the well-to-do and is defined as a 
citizen right, much like public education. Acordingly, 
responsibility for health resides with the individual, 
but the state assumes the financial liability. One might 
conclude that responsibility for health, both individual 
and collective, would be greater in a society in which 
it was defined as a right rather than as a commodity. 
In fact, Cereseto and Waitzkin's exhaustive study of 
World Bank data led them to conclude that "socialist 
countries generally have achieved more favorable PQL 
[Physical Quality of Life] outcomes than capitalist 
countries at equivalent levels of economic develop­
ment" [9). This reallocation of economic resources 
does not, however, insure a reallocation of power. 
Navarro concludes that the former U.S.S.R. did 
not really have a socialized health system [10). 
Rather, the Soviet health system was ultimately in the 
control of a managerial bureaucracy that denied 
direct input from the community. For example, while 
doctors treated victims of the nuclear disaster at 
Chernobyl, the state bureaucracy refused to disclose 
important information about the extensive health 
risks to affected citizens living in the immediate region. 
The exercise of bureaucratic power in such a state 
system does not promote either individual or collective 
responsibility for health. 
STRUCTURAL POWER IN THE NATIONAL 
PARTICIPATORY STRATEGY 
Ideally a health care system would promote 
individual and collective responsibility for health care 
and provide citizens with the necessary means with 
which to satisfy their health needs, both preventive and 
curative. While some health care systems approximate 
this ideal, marketplace or state-managerial approaches 
tend to restrict people's control over the means of 
health production. For a health care system to be 
participatory and democratic, a reallocation of 
structural power would need to occur. Following 
Segall, we argue that any health system opting for 
a more egalitarian health care strategy would have 
the following characteristics: 
(1) emphasis on the social etiology of disease 
and efforts to enhance health through a more 
equal access to goods and services; 
(2) programmatic efforts to encourage participa­
tion in and organization of health-related 
activities; and 
(3) empowerment of the people to take economic 
and political control of health services out of 
the exclusive domain of professionals [I I). 
THE STRUGGLE FOR STRUCTURAL POWER 
IN NICARAGUA: A CASE STUDY 
Nationalized health systems are more egalitarian 
than systems predicated upon each individual's ability 
to pay. Nevertheless, structural power is often in the 
hands of the health bureaucracy. The state apparatus 
for administering a nationalized health system may 
itself structure the field of health choices for its 
citizens. Navarro argues that the configuration of 
power relations in a health system results from 
the interplay of two forces [IO, p. 115]. The one, a 
centripetal force, moves the health system toward the 
political centralization of power by dominant groups, 
be they classes or status groups such as bureaucrats. 
The other, a centrifugal force, is determined by the 
democratization and the decentralization of the 
system. In turn, this democratizing force engenders 
other centrifugal forces such as deprofessionalization, 
despecialization and an emphasis on primary health 
care in rural communities. The Nicaraguan health 
system under Somoza, the Sandinistas and the 
current Chamorro government offers a case study 
that illustrates the interplay of these two forces at 
work to define the structural field of choice within 
several organizational strategies. 
The main features of the public health system under 
the Somoza government were top-down control, frag­
mentation and generalized neglect [12). The primary 
organizational strategy was patron-clientism [13]. The 
dictator exercised vertical control through 23 auton­
omous health institutions which became channels for 
the distribution of favors in exchange for political 
loyalty. The result was a health delivery system whose 
resources went primarily to the cities, especially 
Managua. For example, in 1974 the Ministry of 
Health budget accounted for only 16% of health 
sector expenditures (excluding the water and sewer 
agency). Nearly 75% of the budget was spent in 
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Managua which accounted for only 25% of the entire 
population in that year (14). The effect of this exercise 
of structural power was to leave the vast majority 
of Nicaraguans, especially those in rural areas, to 
exercise their health choices with the meager resources 
that were available in the private or traditional health 
sectors. 
With the ascendancy of the Sandinistas in 1979, 
there emerged a policy to reallocate national 
resources according to 'the logic of the majority.' 
An effort was made to initiate a series of reforms in 
the industrial, agrarian and social welfare sectors that 
would give preference to the needs of the poorest 
sectors of the society, principally in the neglected 
rural areas. The agrarian reform and the literacy 
campaign were early examples of this exercise of 
structural power. A similar effort was made in the 
health sector and illustrates the fundamental feature 
of the new structure of power. Popular participation 
was to replace old patron-clientism. New horizontal 
structures were created at the community level to 
challenge the dictator's vertical channels of patronage. 
In addition, these popular organizations challenged 
the patron-clientism that the physician-dominated 
health bureaucracy continued to reproduce. 
In 1980 a decision was made within the newly 
created Nicaraguan National Unified Health System 
(SNUS) to institutionalize popular participation in the 
planning and implementation of health care delivery 
[ 12, 15). The organization within the Ministry of 
Health that was charged with this task was the 
Division of Communication and Popular Education 
in Health (DECOPS). The organizational structure of 
participation included the creation of popular health 
councils ('consejos populares de salud', CPSs) at local, 
regional and national levels. Several voluntary associ­
ations, called mass organizations ('organizaciones de 
masas'), participated in health planning and delivery. 
The Division of Communication and Popular Educa­
tion in Health had originally intended the health 
councils to be made up exclusively of the popular 
organizations. They could thereby better negotiate 
community health concerns and strategies with the 
Ministry as a partner in planning. With the emergence 
of the mass drug administration programs ('popular 
health days') in 1981, however. the health councils 
became a joint body of rep1..:sentatives from the 
popular organizations and the Ministry. The effect was 
to subordinate the health councils to the centralized 
planning of the Ministry while the popular organiz­
ations were more involved in staging the health work 
days (16). The mass drug administration programs 
became arenas in which the popular health councils 
and health promoters first challenged the efforts 
of professionals to define the field of choices (15). 
These attempts were met with resistance from many 
volunteers and health educators. The stage was set for 
further tests between professionals and community 
people on the field of choice within which the Popular 
Health Councils were to work. 
After the first national mass drug administration 
programs of 1981 and 1982, the Popular Health 
Councils turned their attention to the exercise of 
some control over health institutions and health 
personnel. For the purposes of the present discussion, 
these efforts can be understood as attempts to 
'restructure the field of choices.' The meetings of 
several health councils in northern Nicaragua reveal 
the range of challenges to professional control which 
the Popular Health Councils, as a participatory 
strategy, allowed to surface, and to be acted upon. 
The new field of choice included the supervision and 
evaluation of medical personnel in the area clinics 
and hospitals. 
The Popular Health Council requested that the 
Ministry advise it when evaluations were to be held. 
It stipulated that health personnel should be evalu­
ated on their performance in the areas of preventive 
medicine and popular education. One area clinic was 
singled out for specific criticisms. Members pointed 
out that physicians were not keeping their hours in 
the area clinic of El Carmen and patients were often 
treated condescendingly. To provide for more account­
ability in provider-patient relationships, the Health 
Council agreed to recommend that all health personnel 
wear a name tag for easier identification. Another 
complaint was that some people had to wait in line 
while others were allowed to go forward because of 
favoritism ('el amiguismo'). Members of the Health 
Council asked that the clinic look for more efficient 
ways to handle the patient load. They recommended 
increased use of volunteers in clerical tasks. 
Another struggle for structural power centered on 
the use of local folk healers. The Popular Health 
Council of the rural district of Rio Viejo in Northern 
Nicaragua had asked the Regional Office of the 
Ministry to assign the local folk healer to their newly 
constructed health post. At about the same time, the 
Ministry of Health had ordered a folk healer in 
another village to stop practicing medicine there. The 
people from that village had written to La Barricada, 
the national newspaper of the Sandinista Party, and 
complained. The Departmental Health Council re­
sponded by commissioning the Women's Association 
to take a census of all practitioners of folk medicine 
('los recursos empiricos') in the Department. These 
events seem to have precipitated a special meeting 
of the Popular Organizations and the Ministry in 
the county seat of El Arroyo on 12 April, 1982. The 
objective of the meeting was to formulate a general 
policy towards folk healers. 
The discussion revealed that the community held 
quite different opinions of the social and cultural 
authority of folk healers compared with the physician 
in the local clinic. The participants offered what 
amounted to common complaints against the pro­
fessional practitioners of medicine in rural areas. The 
folk healer is available day and night; the physician 
only during the day .... The healer makes home visits, 
while the physician never moves from the clinic .... 
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The healer is a confidante and gives emotional 
support to the patient. .. . The folk healer's practice 
of medicine is more in accord with the beliefs and 
expectations of the people. . . . The healer shares 
his/her knowledge, but the doctor does not explain or 
educate one to the nature of the illness or the reason 
for the treatment. ... The people can tell the differ­
ence between the illnesses which healers can treat 
and those they cannot, but people often go only to 
them because professional health services are not 
available. . . . The meeting had the effect of fore­
stalling further action against the folk healers by the 
Ministry. 
The structural power of medical patron-clientism 
in many developing capitalist and socialist countries 
is often represented in two organizational schema, 
that of the administrative hierarchy of the Ministry 
and that of the referral system. What is different in the 
Nicaraguan case is that the Ministry of Health consti­
tuted yet a third structure influencing the decision­
making process. The Popular Health Councils at local, 
regional and national levels act as a 'lever' which can 
be used to move the administrative 'pyramid' and the 
referral 'octopus' to function in an arena larger than 
what their particular bureaucratic or professional 
interests might dictate. 
The Community Health Workers, likewise, had 
institutional advocates within the Ministry of Health 
at both national and regional levels in the Division 
of Communication and Popular Education in Health. 
That Division was made up of health educators 
whose activities, while coordinated with the other 
Divisions within the Ministry, were Jess under the 
control of the medical profession. The result was a 
healthy tension between professional and popular 
health agendas, or to use Navarro's terms, between 
'centripetal' and 'centrifugal' forces within the health 
care system [10, p. 115]. The Division of Commun­
ication and Popular Education in Health, along 
with the Popular Health Councils and local Health 
Educators sought to maintain that dialectic in 
Nicaragua. The increasing pressures of the Contra 
war gradually shifted the health priorities from 
preventive back to curative care. As rural violence 
curtailed outreach efforts, the clinics and hospitals 
again became the locus of most health care. To the 
extent that these institutions are dominated by 
medical professionals, the field of choices open to 
popular health organizations were again constrained 
by these 'centripetal' forces. Compounding the situ­
ation was a large exodus of physicians from the 
country because of the United States' embargo and 
the demands of the war. 
The electoral victory of the Chamorro government 
in 1990 ushered in a new configuration of structural 
power in the health sector. While there was no direct 
repeal of Sandinista health policy, there has been 
a general reduction of services for several reasons. 
In an effort to reduce government spending and 
conform to IMF loan conditions, the Chamorro 
government offered a generous 'once and for all' cash 
award lo public employees who resigned their jobs. 
Many health workers, frustrated by the Jack of 
medical supplies and medicines, have chosen to leave 
the health sector. The Ministry of Health reduced 
its hours of operation to between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. 
Physicians carry on their private practice in the 
afternoons. In effect, there has been a generalized 
slowdown in public health activity, and a decided 
shift to private sector medicine. There has been an 
increase in health activities among non-governmental 
organizations such as Movimiento Comunal, but 
PVOs operate with fewer resources than does the 
Ministry of Health. 
Needless to say, the field of health choices for many 
Nicaraguans, already limited by the military and 
economic effects of the contra war, have not improved 
noticeably since the war ended and the embargo 
lifted. Now, however, the field of choices are being 
defined by the demands of bi-lateral and multilateral 
lending agencies, such as USAID and the IMF. The 
'logic of the majority' has been replaced by the 'logic 
of the bankers.' To that extent Nicaraguans must 
face the professional dominance of financiers, as well 
as physicians. In the political economy of health 
structural power is exercised not only among national 
status groups such as medical professionals, but also 
by actors in the international arena. Even though 
medical professionals might argue against economic 
retrenchment and for an increase in expenditures in 
the health sector, their assertion of professional 
power would still effectively limit the field of choices 
open to care-seekers. 
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE OF THE FIELD 
OF HEALTH CHOICF.S 
Professional dominance may be found in any 
political economy partly because it is a byproduct of 
the rationalization of Western medicine. Starr [17) 
notes that physicians have exercised cultural and 
social authority in Western medicine. Their cultural 
authority is seen in the ability to define the meaning 
of health and illness. To the extent that patients 
accept these cultural and ideological meanings, they 
are disposed to follow the doctor's orders (social 
authority) and to believe that the doctor is the 
appropriate source of help to seek. 
The fact that medicine and other health services 
have become increasingly specialized and linked 
with control over specialized skills and knowledge, 
means that all health care systems must deal with the 
assertion of professional dominance. In a 'free' health 
market economy, the professionalization of medicine 
represents, in Larson's terms, a sociopolitical move­
ment organized to achieve a 'monopoly of opportun­
ities in a market of services or labor and, inseparably, 
monopoly of status and work privileges' [18]. State­
managerial approaches may constrain or eliminate 
the market dynamics, but professionals often still 
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exert their relative power to obtain status, financial 
and work privileges. 
In a society employing a participatory strategy, 
the balance of power between professionals and 
laypersons is a fine line that must be continually 
negotiated and defended in order to maintain high 
levels of involvement of both professionals and lay­
persons. Each new decision, such as whether to spend 
money on a piece of diagnostic equipment or on a 
nutrition-education program, becomes the focus for 
exertions of power and authority. By definition, 
national participatory strategies are aimed at maxi­
mizing widespread involvement of lay individuals 
and groups, who at the same time are necessarily 
lacking technical or professional expertise and, thus, 
susceptible to deferring to professional authority. 
One of the key results of such societal deference to 
medical authority is that medical professionals are 
granted enormous power to define health and illness 
-that is, to define what areas of life 'ought' to 
come under their domination. For example, in many 
modem societies, we have witnessed in just a few 
decades the extensive medicalization of childbirth, 
menopause, child-rearing, virtually all forms of devi­
ance (such as alcoholism, promiscuity, and child 
abuse), weight-maintenance, old age and dying (19]. 
The implications of professionalization and 
medicalization for the allocation of responsibility 
and blame are, first, that they create the model of 
the medical professional as authoritative, powerful 
and active, while the health care recipient is passive, 
obedient and weak (20]. This dominance-dependence 
relationship is often embodied in policy and organiz­
ational structures, such as the organization of 
hospitals and clinics. Second, to protect or to extend 
their dominance, professionals and organizations 
often maintain tight control over the knowledge or 
expertise which would enable laypersons to make 
informed choices. 
Third, professionalization and medicalization 
produce the expectation that the sick person (or 
family of the sick person) ought to seek professional 
help for all medicalized 'problems' and to comply 
with all 'orders' from that authoritative professional. 
Neverthless, many physicians complain that patients 
consult them for unimportant reasons; they also 
complain that patients lack humility to accept medical 
experts' judgment (21 ]. The contradictory norm, then, 
is that laypersons should be actively expert in judging 
correctly which ailments to refer to the professional, 
and then assume a humbly passive role when under 
the care of the professional. 
Professionalization and medicalization result in 
blame being allocated not only for getting sick, but 
also for not seeking professional help soon enough, 
for not seeking the proper professional care and for 
not doing whatever that professional says to do. 
Indeed, some U.S. courts have prosecuted parents for 
failing to meet these responsibilities. 
Professionalization and medicalization processes, 
thus, promote dependency of the sick person upon 
profession experts, while simultaneously deflecting 
much responsibility from the professional to the 
health-care seeker. Social policies and organizational 
structures which perpetuate or extend these powerful 
sources of dependency and dominance make indi­
viduals responsible without giving them the effective 
power and sense of agency to accomplish society's 
expectations. 
CONCLUSION 
We can now return to our original question: 
To what extent do health care strategies in a given 
political economy increase people's perceptions of 
responsibility to take charge of their health, but do 
not structurally empower them to satisfy their health 
needs? 
Responsibility in the health marketplace is placed 
squarely on the individual. In an interview Dr Louis 
Sullivan, Former Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, asked Americans to make their health 'a 
national obsession' (22]. "Each American," he said, 
"must accept personal responsibility for better health 
behavior and practices." This assertion was followed 
by a litany of behaviors that such responsibility 
implied: stopping smoking, adopting good eating and 
drinking habits, getting vaccinations, and wearing 
seat belts. No mention was made of the social and 
economic obstacles that limit health choices for most 
Americans. No recognition was given to the corpor­
ate or bureaucratic structures that actually contribute 
to illness and poor health among many Americans. 
Both personal and social responsibility are exer­
cised within the state-managerial strategy. The respon­
sibility for the cost of the health care is shared more 
equitably among the citizenry. Nevertheless, the field 
of choices can still be bounded by professional and 
bureaucratic dominance. As nation-states, such as 
Nicaragua, attempt to move to more participatory 
forms of health care, physicians, health administra­
tors and citizens will need to delinate anew the field 
of choice in which personal and public responsibility 
for health is exercised. 
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